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Ananth Padmanabhan†
Who can afford to do professional work for nothing? What hobbyist
can put 3-man years into programming, finding all bugs, documenting his product and distribute for free? The fact is, no one besides us
has invested a lot of money in hobby software . . . there is very little
incentive to make this software available to hobbyists. Most directly,
the thing you do is theft . . . Nothing would please me more than
being able to hire ten programmers and deluge the hobby market with
good software.

—Bill Gates’ open letter in 1976 to
the homebrew Computer Club1

I. I NTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen the rise and rise of free and open source software
(FoSS) as it has made considerable inroads into Government, healthcare,
media, automotive, energy, finance, aerospace, retail and several other sectors. 2 There are studies that reveal exponential expansion of the total amount
of source code as well as the total number of open source projects over a
period of more than ten years.3 FoSS is arguably preferred as server software, operating systems embedded in products ranging from mobile phones
to video recording devices, and scripting language for the internet, and even
Microsoft had released two substantial blocks of code under this license

†
1

2

3

Fellow, Carnegie India.
Samir Chopra & Scott D. Dexter, Decoding Liberation: The Promise of Free and
open Source Software 12 (2008).
Future of Open Source Survey, BlackduckSoftware.com, http://www.blackducksoftware.com/future-of-open-source (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
Amit Deshpande & Dirk Riehle, The Total Growth of Open Source, in open Source
Development, Communities and Quality 197, 197 (Barbara Russo et al. eds., 2008).
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in 2009.4 All of this compels us to question Mr. Gates and ask whether he
went terribly wrong with the grim assessment of “rational” coder behavior
made way back in 1976? As a necessary corollary, what does the success of
FoSS teach us, and how best can these teachings help us craft sound legal
and economic policies that foster innovation in the world of technology?
This paper attempts to understand the incentive structures, the hierarchical
organisation, and the shared norms, all of which have certainly contributed
to the growth of FoSS to where it stands today.
At the same time, this paper is no roving enquiry into the FoSS movement. There is a conceptual anchor to this study, that being the twin tragedies in property theory – the jurist’s dream, the policy maker’s nightmare.
The first is the tragedy of the commons, and the second, its mirror image,
the anti-commons. They make it important for property regimes to walk the
tightrope between two extremes: i) too many beneficiaries and no effective
bearers of rights, and ii) too many rights holders and diminished benefits
over time. Because they find their origins in real property, some recalibration is required before applying them to the world of ideas and innovation.
This paper does that, and then enquires whether: i) the FoSS model/s of
innovation manage to successfully walk this tightrope and balance several
competing interests and concerns, and ii) if it does, whether similar models can be developed by businesses to foster innovation in other realms of
technology, and should be encouraged by lawmakers including by way of
reform to the intellectual property laws as we have traditionally used and
understood them. Academic literature that equates the FoSS model to a
“commons” of ideas abound, but as discussed in Part II, a large part of
such literature ignores, or deals cursorily with, why the FoSS commons has
stayed clear of hardin’s tragedy.5 This paper attempts to provide an explanation, largely highlighting the oversight of theorists who ignore nuances
of the FoSS model when conveniently equating it with a plain “commons”.
The deeper contribution of this paper is however in the realm of the anticommons. After recalibrating the scope of this tragedy in the intellectual
property space, this paper argues in Part III that the FoSS model is a larger
success when it comes to averting an anticommons tragedy than in creating a plain “commons”. This success, not unexplored in much detail in the
existing literature, can potentially mould the foundation for applying the
open source model as a more general template while crafting policy in the
intellectual property space.

4

5

Josh Lerner & Mark Schankerman, Comingled Code: open Source and economic
Development 1-2 (2010).
Garrett hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 (3859) Science 1243, (1968).
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Part I of this paper surveys the FoSS movement from its early days to
the present, including its fundamental philosophy and on-the-ground execution of such philosophy, its growth in size and scale, and the nuances
in the ideological postures of its advocates. This part also looks into the
different factors that have contributed to the growth of FoSS, such as the
motivations of coders to be part of a “free” creative endeavor, the relatively
flexible hierarchical structures that give considerable space for “free play”,
and the shared values that integrate coders completely into the movement
thus nurturing new creative activity from time to time. Part II switches gears
to property theory, focusing on the tragedy of the commons. After outlining the contours of this concept as initially developed in the context of real
property, I proceed to gauge its possibility in the intangible property space.
Then, I go on to explore reasons as to why this tragedy has not apparently
occurred in the FoSS experience and whether such apparent non-occurrence
should embolden us to discount the role of intellectual property rights in
incentivizing innovation. I present an alternate vision of the FoSS model,
one where both proprietary and FoSS models have in fact been instrumental to a considerable extent in averting a “theft economy” in the software
world and thus preventing the occurrence of this tragedy. Part III proceeds
to examine the “anticommons” tragedy, recalibrates it in the context of
intangible intellectual property, and builds a case for my conclusion that the
FoSS model has been effective in averting a serious anticommons tragedy in
the software sector – an effect that has not been given its due recognition.
A short conclusion follows in Part IV, where I discuss, in brief, the lessons
for copyright and patent policy from this success of the FoSS movement in
averting an anticommons problem.

II. THE L AND

OF THE

“FREE”

The one revolutionary idea in FoSS which can be considered the acorn
for the oak tree is the decision to provide end users with the source code.
everything else, including the flexibility in fixing bugs and cleaning up or
even quickly replacing flawed versions, the motivation of several young coders to write software and contribute to the “movement”, the more democratic and less rigid structures of hierarchy in open source software project,
and the comfort that industries today have in using open source software,
can be perceived as direct or indirect consequences of this decision. In sharp
contrast, proprietary software only allows the end user a limited license to
use the software, with no access to the source code. The source code is protected as a trade secret, and redistribution of the software is impermissible
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under copyright law. This striking difference between FoSS and proprietary
software in their approaches to the disclosure or otherwise of the source
code forms the fulcrum of the study here. For this reason, the story behind
the free software movement, which is also interlinked in interesting ways
with the history of coding and software in general, deserves brief narration.

A. (R)evolutionary Days
The electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer (eDVAC), designed
and delivered for use in 1949, marked a seminal moment in the world of
machines. The world had its first prominent “stored program” machine –
one with which humans could interact purely through software without
changing or rewiring the hardware to suit new functions and data.6 But
this was simply not enough because the world required high-level programming languages so that programs written in them could be automatically
translated by compilers into machine code. There was real urgency in moving beyond “assembly languages” and batch processing. The concerns of
innovation in this field and era were multifarious and diverse, and only
collaborative efforts could tackle them. The Project for the Advancement
of Coding Techniques (PACT), a collaborative venture involving IBM and
four of its customers, worked on writing compiler software. The Society
to help Alleviate Redundant effort (ShARe) worked in collaboration to
write library routines that all of its members could use. These collaborative
efforts were good for the industry too, as IBM saw increased acceptance of
its equipment.7 The Digital equipment Corporation (DeC) expressly encouraged customers to participate in the ongoing development of its products
because it simply lacked the internal resources to develop software. DeC
went to the extent of furnishing customers with copies of its technical manuals. This openness and flexibility attracted universities to use its machine,
the Programmed Data Processor (PDP), leading to a hacker culture built
around the machine.8 Information sharing, much needed for any effective
collaboration, became the name of the game. The world of software development simply could not afford wastage of time spent reinventing the wheel
due to lack of coordination.9
In 1969, UNIX came. UNIX, the first operating system to be written in
C – a machine-independent high level programming language – tantalizingly
promised a bridge between ‘geeks’ working on different hardware platforms.
6
7
8
9

Samir Chopra & Scott D. Dexter, supra note 1, at 3-4.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Steven Levy, hackers 28-29 (2d ed. 2010).
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AT&T, UNIX’s “owner”, could not enter computing business due to antitrust barriers, resulting in free licensing of UNIX along with the source
code. UNIX was also the first operating system to include core internet
software like the TCP/IP networking protocols. This provided substantial
nourishment to the communication culture, fueled by e-mail and bulletin
boards that had sprung up around the ARPANeT and its backbone PDP10 sites.10 The hobbyists and enthusiasts who were, around the same time,
experimenting with hardware to lay the foundation for personal computing,
strongly believed that software must be free and open in order to spread
the word about the growing power of personal computing. Thus, by 1975,
three separate hacker cultures were thriving: the ITS community at MIT, the
UNIX/C networked crowd, and the personal computing enthusiasts located
largely on the West Coast. In these communities, the notion of software as
a good that could be sold, or as property that could be stolen, was alien.11
But this notion was increasingly gaining purchase in the fledgling computer industry, and soon enough, the hacker space too. By the mid-1980s,
a new criterion for hacker stardom had crept into the equation, in addition
to elegance, innovation, and coding pyrotechnics: awesome sales figures.12
DeC weakened the ITS community by discontinuing its PDP-10 series, and
Symbolics, a spin-off company, depopulated it by hiring many of its hackers.
The modern computers of this period, such as the VAX or the 68020, had
their own operating systems, but one had to sign a non-disclosure agreement
to procure even the executable copy, let alone the source code.13 By 1983,
the hundreds of proprietary software licenses riding on the microprocessor wave had become strong enough to satisfy courts and deter potential
infringers.14 once the antitrust barrier against AT&T had run its course,
they started licensing UNIX on proprietary terms and stopped providing
access to the source code even for academic purposes.15 Licensees of UNIX,
including IBM, Sun and Microsoft, developed their versions of UNIX and
licensed these versions only in object code form, resulting in “forking”, i.e.
the development of many incompatible versions.16
As Richard Stallman recounts, these and other developments that tilted
the balance heavily in favor of proprietary software models, presented him
10
11
12
13
14

15
16

Samir Chopra & Scott D. Dexter, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Steven Levy, supra note 9, at 389.
Richard M. Stallman, Free Software, Free Society 7-8 (2d ed. 2010).
Sam Williams, Free as in Freedom 2.0: Richard Stallman’s Crusade for Free
Software 99 (2d ed. 2010).
Samir Chopra & Scott D. Dexter, supra note 1, at 136-37.
heather J. Meeker, The open Source Alternative: Understanding Risks and
Leveraging opportunities 5 (2008).
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with a “stark moral choice” to join the “proprietary software” club, leave
the field of computers, or write a program that made a free community possible once again.17 It was his decision to go with the third option that led to
the re-birth or revival of free software. In January 1984, he quit his job at
MIT and began writing GNU software. When GNU emacs, the text editor written by Stallman as an alternative to the proprietary Gosling emacs,
grew in popularity, other coders started getting involved with the GNU
Project. This necessitated more funding, and the Free Software Foundation
(FSF) was born as a consequence.18
Though the initial goal of the GNU project was to develop the complete GNU operating system and then release it, the voluntary nature of the
code-writing activity resulted in users spending unequal amounts of time on
different components of the system. The self-allocation of activity depended
in large measure on the popularity of each component, and the inclination
of coders to keep perfecting existing components without writing new ones.
While this process made these programs much more powerful, and attracted
both funds and contributors to the GNU Project, it also delayed completion
of a minimal working system by several years.19 By 1990, the only major
missing component was the kernel. The GNU hurd, which was being internally developed as the kernel, failed to live up to the mark. however, at that
point, Linus Torvalds who had developed Linux – a Unix-compatible kernel
– made it available as free software. This led to integrating Linux with the
GNU system and giving the world its first free and complete operating system, GNU/Linux, in 1992. 20 From that point, the free software movement
has indeed grown in an unprecedented manner, the important reasons for
which shall be discussed in the following sub-parts.
The above narrative, though brief, becomes important to understand the
political economy behind the free software movement. 21 The key fact that
merits highlighting here is the comprehension that there existed a culture
of information-sharing and collaboration in the early days of the software
industry. “Free” was as much a norm as “proprietary” before proprietary
took the lead at just the point in time when it was technically becoming
more feasible to share and collaborate through an emerging internet. 22 The
existence of a parallel free culture was definitely instrumental in prompting
17
18
19
20
21
22

Richard M. Stallman, supra note 13, at 9.
Id. at 11, 13.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Samir Chopra & Scott D. Dexter, supra note 1, at 1.
Karl Fogel, Producing open Source Software: how to run a Successful Free
Software Project 13 (2009).
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developers like Stallman to resist losing the battle to proprietary, and to try
and work out innovation models within a free system.23 In other words, the
battle was more about regaining free culture than creating it anew.
This distinction becomes important in Part II, when examining whether,
and if so to what extent, the free software model can be considered a template for commons-based production.

B. Shared Norms and Hereditary Licenses
The GNU Project may have been the vision of a few determined coders,
but the free software movement has moved on to achieve much larger and
grander scale and presence today. The foundation of shared norms and
values provided early on and around which all software development was
intended to take effect, is an important reason for this growth. Indeed, if
Stallman or Linus Torvalds were only feeling charitable, they could have
dedicated GNU/Linux to the public and thus given it for “free”. 24 But that
was not the concept of freedom that Stallman or FSF believed in, as revealed
through the recursive “copyleft” mechanism that they chose instead. Theirs
was a notion of freedom influenced by the practice of working with source
code and the benefits this brought about to both end-user experience and
continued innovation. The Free Software Definition, in pursuance of this
notion, lists as integral to any “free” software, four freedoms, namely:
(i) to run the program, for any purpose,
(ii) to study how the program works, and to adapt it to one’s needs,
(iii) to redistribute copies, and
(iv) to improve the program and release such improvements to the public. 25 Without open access to the source code, the second and fourth
freedoms cannot be meaningfully exercised. To guarantee the same
user freedoms over improvements and derivative adaptations of the
original code made by other users, the hereditary licensing model
came in.
23

24

25

Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement, in
open Sources: Voices from the open Source Revolution 53, 55-56 (Chris DiBona et
al. eds., 1999). For more factual information on Stallman’s tussles with the non-disclosure
of source code in the period prior to the launch of the GNU Project, see Sam Williams,
supra note 14, at 1-11.
Tim Berners-Lee had done exactly that when he declared his protocol for the internet and
its implementations to be in the public domain. See Christopher M. Kelty, Two Bits:
The Cultural Significance of Free Software 103 (2008).
heather J. Meeker, supra note 16, at 21.
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The idea behind hereditary licensing is simple enough, and in essence
the same as Stallman’s motivation for the GNU Project: do not to others
what you would not like seeing done to yourself.26 The GNU General Public
License (GPL) which fully internalizes this motto is worth a quick study. The
preamble to this License makes it clear that the “free” in “free software” has
only to do with “freedom” and not “price”. even when copies of a program
are distributed for a fee by the original licensee, the objective is to ensure
that the recipients receive or can demand the source code and do enjoy all
the rights that the original licensee had.27 To guarantee this, GPL imposes
a mirror-image restriction on the licensee: while the licensee has free access
to the source code of the licensed work, any derivative work created by the
licensee has to be distributed in source code subject to the same freedoms,
limitations and restrictions as the licensed work. Because this is so, the subsequent licensee of the derivative work will in turn have to permit further
licensees to enjoy identical freedoms in respect of modifications made by the
subsequent licensee, thus spreading these freedoms in a “viral” fashion. 28
The fallout of these provisions is two-fold: (i) it prevents distribution of any
covered work, i.e. the unmodified program or a work based on the program,
on terms inconsistent with the freedoms and restrictions in GPL, and (ii)
it effectively prevents combining software covered under GPL with those
covered by other licenses that impose a different set of restrictions, most
notably proprietary software and even software covered under other, less
free, open-source licenses. 29 To overcome possible arguments of absence of
contractual privity that subsequent licensees in the distribution chain may
take up, the license also provides that whenever a covered work is conveyed,
the recipient shall automatically receive a license from the original licensors,
to run, modify and propagate that work, subject to the terms of the GPL. 30
The preamble and the terms of the license also protect against instances
where the redistributors may obtain software patents, by making it clear
that any such patents are to be mandatorily licensed along with the code.31
The disclaimer of warranties in respect of the licensed work is coupled with
an express permission to licensees to offer support or warranty protection
for a fee, thus providing room for a business model.32
26
27

28

29
30

31
32

Richard Stallman, supra note 13, at 9.
Andrew M. St. Laurent, Understanding open Source and Free Software
Licensing 36-37 (2004).
Sections 4 and 5 of the GPL Ver. 3, available at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last
visited Jan. 6, 2014).
Andrew M. St. Laurent, supra note 27, at 157.
Andrew M. St. Laurent, supra note 27, at 43; Section 10 of the GPL Ver. 3, supra note
28.
Section 11 of the GPL Ver. 3, supra note 28.
Andrew M. St. Laurent, supra note 27, at 38; Section 4 of the GPL Ver. 3, supra note 28.
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The GPL model does not however give out the full story. In reality, there is
no one hacker ideology, but many such ideologies built on differing perspectives on free software as an end in itself, and the hostility to or acceptance
of commercial software and its vendors.33 These ideologies clashed in full
public view in the mid ’90s, primarily due to Linus Torvalds’ increasing popularity among young coders who did not find commercial software reprehensible or unethical. Many of them, including Torvalds, grew up in a world
of proprietary software, and contributed to free software without perceiving
any injustice in non-free software. Therefore, they were mostly concerned
about the technical inferiority of any program, not its licensing model.34
This pragmatism and openness to commercial software soon found takers in
industry as well, as best revealed by the Netscape story.35 The Netscape episode culminated in the pragmatist camp and industry supporters replacing
“free” software with the more benign expression, “open source”.36
The diverse ideologies thriving in the “open” since the mid ’90s have in
turn found expression in the FoSS licensing model too. The very zealous and
openly anti-commercial FSF’s attitude is reflected in GPL.37 Similarly, the
pragmatist philosophy is reflected in the most permissive academic licenses,
such as the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) license, 38 and the middleof-the-road ones such as the Apache License that permit original modifications by contributors to be distributed on proprietary terms.39 So, there is no
singular standard for an open source license, only a spectrum of permissive
licenses with differing attitudes to both free and commercial software. At
the same time, the open Source Definition (oSD) instils fundamental values
into the licensing model by prescribing ten essential pre-requisites that any
license must comply with in order to qualify as an “open source” license.40
These ten principles reflect an interesting balance between retaining the core
values of the free/open source movement such as distribution of the source
33

34
35

36
37
38
39

40

eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and The Bazaar: Musings on Linux and open
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary 67-68 (2d ed. 2001).
Sam Williams, supra note 14, at 161-62.
Netscape, when faced with losing market share for its Netscape Communicator, an
internet browser directly competing with Microsoft’s Internet explorer, chose to shift
from a proprietary to an open source model in January 1998. however, they shunned
the GPL license due to various reasons, instead crafting the Mozilla Public License that
attempted to tread a pragmatist middle path that would work in a “corporate” setting. See
LAWReNCe RoSeN, oPeN SoURCe LICeNSING: SoFTWARe FReeDoM AND
INTeLLeCTUAL PRoPeRTy LAW 141-42 (2004).
Sam Williams, supra note 14, at 165-68.
eric S. Raymond, supra note 33, at 69.
Id. at 70.
Section 4 of the Apache License, available at http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICeNSe2.0.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
LAWReNCe RoSeN, supra note 35, at 4-6.
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code and unhindered re-distribution without any discrimination, and providing room for industry to come out with derivative adaptations and modifications that can be licensed on proprietary terms if so desired.
The free/open source movements do not restrict their methods to protect
and propagate core values, to licensing models. There is an equally significant, much less visible, process of initiation to the world of free/open source
programming that imparts the core values and beliefs of the movements to
fresh coders. This process is important to ensure continued involvement of
existing coders and induction of new ones. Without this process, the act of
building on to code would come to a standstill, effectively freezing any free/
open source project that is not backed by the industry. Again, the shared
norms will necessarily vary within projects, depending on the dominant
beliefs of the coders who matter. Some may be radical in their outlook,
lending that perspective to new entrants and the project as a whole. Less
rigid views, focused more on the technical than the political, may prevail in
other cases. Regardless, there are baseline norms, and the success of these
norms in welcoming, and binding, participants to the project can eventually
determine its fate. In other words, by allowing users to become co-developers or contributors, and retaining their skill sets, FoSS encourages “natural
product evolution”. Such “natural product evolution” takes place within the
norms of a community, the norms themselves being dependent on the nature
of the project at hand.41 Communities evolve in the free software world
through role transformation, as community members who change their roles
– such as from peripheral to active developers, for instance – also manage to
change the social dynamics and reshape the structure of the community.42
The evolution of a FoSS community is thus determined by two factors:
(i) the social mechanism of the community that encourages and enables
individual role transformation, and (ii) the existence of motivated members
who aspire to play roles with larger influence.43 The motivation for members
to so aspire, despite no monopoly rights over their creative output, is discussed under sub-part D, below. To explain the former, studies have relied
on Legitimate Peripheral Participation (LPP), a community learning theory.44 The scope and character of such LPP varies depending on the nature of
the project, and in some sense, is inversely proportional to the “cathedral”

41

42
43
44

yunwe ye et al., The Co-Evolution of Systems & Communities in Free and Open Source
Software Development, in Free/open Source Software Development 61 (Stefan Koch
ed., 2005).
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 70-71.
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structure of the project.45 exploration-oriented FoSS projects, which aim to
push the frontier of software development collectively through the sharing of
innovations, require a high level of quality that necessarily brings in a tight
control over the periphery. even service-oriented FoSS projects give lesser
leeway for community evolution through peripheral participation, interested
as they are in providing stable, reliable and robust services without much
disruption. on the other hand, utility-oriented FoSS projects that attempt
to develop functional solutions to existing problems follow a more decentralized model. Such projects provide better opportunities to peripheral developers to spread their efforts into the whole system and establish themselves as
active developers or core members in the larger community.46 Social ties such
as friendship, which influence opinions and outlook in the real world, can
also play an important role in the FoSS world to ensure coordinated activity, pursuit of core values, and attainment of technical results that meet a
certain quality.47 Similarly, conflicts that happen on internet relay chats and
mailing lists over use of non-free tools and acceptance of newcomers into
the fray do contribute to building a community of practice and strengthening teamwork.48 Finally, sustained collaborative development of code, coupled with involvement in hacker conferences and discussions and decisions
around free software licenses and project policy, reinforces ethics and belief
in core values over a period of time.49 As a result, over the course of participating in an open source project, coders develop a more vigorous and overt
ethical stance toward the uniqueness of their project and the importance of
free software than when first joining.50

C. Hierarchies and Creative Openness
The propagation of core values through licensing models and other means,
as discussed above, is certainly integral to the success of the free/open source
45
46
47

48

49

50

See eric S. Raymond, supra note 33, at 27-28, 31.
yunwe ye et al., supra note 41, at 73-75.
Thomas Basset, Coordination and Social Structures in an Open Source Project: VideoLAN,
in Free/open Source Software Development, supra note 35, at 125, 129-30, 139-42.
Contrary view has been expressed in this more recent study, Chaim Fershtman & Neil
Gandal, Direct and Indirect Knowledge Spillovers: The Social Network of Open-Source
Projects, 42 The RAND J. of econ. 70, 88 (2011). This study concludes that there is no
evidence of any correlation between contributor closeness centrality and project success,
though such evidence exists in the case of project closeness centrality.
Margaret S. elliott & Walt Scacchi, Free Software Development: Cooperation and Conflict
in a Virtual Organizational Culture, in Free/open Source Software Development,
supra note 35, at 152, 160, 162-66.
e. Gabriella Coleman & Benjamin hill, The Social Production of Ethics in Debian and
Free Software Communities: Anthropological Lessons for Vocational Ethics, in Free/
open Source Software Development, supra note 35, at 273, 274.
Id. at 279.
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movement, but equally significant are the structures necessary to oversee
what is, at first glance, a frenzied playground of coding activity. The bazaar
model where “given more eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” – a less formal
expression of Linus’s Law: Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost every problem will be characterized quickly and the fix
obvious to someone51 – is yet workable only when there is some form of control over the changes made by contributors to the code development process.
otherwise, Brooks’s Law would have taken over, and adding more programmers to a late project would only have made it later.52 Though the conceptual
integrity of a program, in the cathedral vision of development, can only be
preserved by a hierarchy with a system master architect at the very top and
sub-architects below, 53 open source projects have more flexible hierarchies.
This is needed to an extent to attract all those “eyeballs” in the first place.
Pre-assigned division of work is likely to be perceived as repressive and
thereby demotivate interested participants as well as hinder getting the best
out of each person’s abilities from among a scattered resource pool.54 For
this reason, coordination in free software privileges adaptability over planning, and relies on hierarchy only to resolve any tension between individual curiosity and collective coordination.55 Such tension, if unchecked, can
result in failure of the project, or its “forking” or splintering into variants. 56
Studies of different open source projects reveal the use of central source
code repositories that make use of some form of a Concurrent Versions
System (CVS) to keep track of the changes made to a set of files, and to allow
several developers to collaborate. Version control is principally about change
management: identifying each discrete change made to the project’s files,
annotating with metadata including the date and author of each change, and
providing this information to developers who seek it.57 These repositories
guarantee that each file change – called a commit or a “check in” – creates a new file version, thus keeping previous versions accessible as well. 58
51
52

53
54

55
56

57

58

eric S. Raymond, supra note 33, at 30.
Frederick P. Brooks, The Mythical Man-Month: essays on Software engineering
25 (2d ed. 1995). Interestingly, even this 20 th Anniversary edition of this pioneering work
makes no reference to free or open source models of software development.
Id. at 257.
Johan Soderberg, hacking Capitalism: The Free and open Source Software
Movement 156-57 (2008).
Christopher M. Kelty, supra note 24, at 211.
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Economic Perspectives on Open Source, in Perspectives on
Free and open Source Software 47, 53 (Joseph Feller et al. eds., 2005).
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Because debugging is a vital process required for a program to transition
to a programming product or a component in a programming system,59 the
technical infrastructure also necessarily includes a bug-tracking system.
These centralized defect-tracking systems register information reports on
bugs provided by any developer, and facilitate the committal of changes to
the repository to address specific bugs.60 Difficulties in the effective sharing
of information form the rationale for Brooks’s Law, which frowns upon the
involvement of too many coders in a software development process. The Law
especially relies on the sequential nature of debugging, which requires additional time to be spent on communication between the different coders.61
To mitigate this concern, open source systems, in addition to the centralized
bug-tracking system, make use of mailing lists, newsgroups and real-time
chat systems, to channel the flow of communication and to bring everyone
on to the same page without much delay.62
While all developers are allowed to download files from the repositories and work on them, only “committers”, a chosen group of developers
with special privileges, are allowed to commit changes to files in the repositories. Developers have to usually demonstrate their competence through
high-quality contributions for a certain period, before they are considered
for committer status. This decision may also require affirmance from more
senior committers and supervisors. even after being conferred committer
status, certain open source projects provide mentorship avenues to newly
anointed committers.63 open source projects such as GNoMe, where different corporate partners pay their own employees to participate in code
development, maintain a rigid distinction between volunteers who can contribute to different modules, and “contributors” who can actually commit
these changes to the repository. In such cases, volunteers have to submit their
patches for review and committal by these “contributors”, who alone have
access to the CVS.64
however, there are open source projects that follow more relaxed rules
when it comes to committing changes to the repository, relying on more of an
honor system. here, developers are permitted to commit changes anywhere
in the system but requested to confine their changes to certain specifically
59
60

61
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assigned portions. There are advantages to this relaxed approach too, such
as saving on administrative overheads entailed in granting wider privileges
when coders expand their skill sets, and more importantly, encouraging an
atmosphere of trust and mutual respect.65 Some open source projects also
have ‘super-reviewers’ who review most code before it is committed,66 and
module owners who need to approve the committing of code into the particular module whose development is within their supervision.67 In some cases,
there will be different middle level managers to supervise important tasks:
patch managers who make sure that every patch is followed up through to
some stable state,68 translation managers who supervise the translation of
the software’s documentation or the software interface itself into languages
comfortable for developers from different nationalities,69 documentation
managers who ensure that the software documentation is kept organized,
up-to-date, and consistent with itself,70 issue managers who familiarize
themselves with the bug tracking system and manage the tackling of duplicate, incomplete, poorly described and unaddressed issues / bug reports,71
and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) managers who maintain the overall
quality of FAQ and write new FAQ entries based on concerns raised in the
mailing lists and other communicative media.72
Most successful open source projects will have significant number of people involved with the code-writing process, necessitating the presence of a
top-level management to avoid “forking”, to take important decisions such
as the timing of new version releases, and quite simply to ensure the operational health and survivability of a project.73 The concept of a benevolent
dictator is not alien to the open source model. These individuals command
respect among peers through good coding skills coupled with charm and an
engaging persona that set them up for natural leadership. Their influence
65
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is generally felt only as a kind of casting vote when the normal processes
of discussion and deliberation fail to throw up a conclusive verdict.74 As
projects get older, they tend to move away from the benevolent dictatorship
model and toward more openly democratic systems.75 Many significant open
source projects are headed by groups or core teams comparable to the board
of directors in traditional organizations.76 These groups are either nominated or democratically elected.77
There are complexities with the release of new versions of free / open
source software that do not exist in the case of proprietary software. They
arise because development is an ongoing process in open source. Not all
developers may be satisfied with the existing “version”, or be inclined to
“stabilize” their creative efforts.78 This is also a positive feature when viewed
from a technical standpoint as the attempt to achieve perfection is not rendered immobile at any particular stage due to the release of a version. At
the same time, users do not need to wait endlessly for the end product to
achieve perfection to the satisfaction of all developers.79 open source projects manage to achieve this by following a trunk and branches model, where
the trunk is the code that keeps evolving and the branches are the release
versions.80 This is easier said than done though because considerable amount
of planning and decision-making goes into the timelines for release of the
alpha, beta and final versions of any particular “branch”.81 Moreover, it is
necessary to decide on, and communicate in a tactful manner, restrictions
on changes to the development branch in a phased manner, to achieve the
final release version without confusion or compromise of the overall development momentum.82 To realize these needs, open source projects resort
to a system of positive and express voting in favor of last-minute changes,
or rely on a release owner who is responsible for approving or rejecting
changes and bug fixes.83 Release managers keep a track of the changes that
are under consideration, already approved, or important and yet unnoticed,
and prompt other developers to take timely action.84 Companies that distribute open source products for revenue also necessarily require a team that
74
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carries out economic calculations to decide on the extent of efforts that a
new distribution calls for.85

D. Motivations, Extrinsic and Intrinsic
The success of any free / open source project, and the FoSS movement as
a whole, is closely tied with the motivations of coders who are willing to
devote time to a “free” endeavor. A generalized explanation offered for this
phenomenon is that innovators innovate, regardless of monopolies, because
the return to them from deploying new ideas is high. Free markets have
never historically guaranteed a market to any merchant, yet innovation continues.86 While this view may hold good in certain cases, and open source
model could well be one such, not all capital investment in developing
new ideas and executing them can survive absent special legal protection.
otherwise, any one purchaser could easily destroy the monopoly by reproducing the information at little or no cost.87 Moreover, most of code-writing
in open source projects is incremental, with no real opportunity for many
of the individual contributors to monetize the code. They incur an opportunity cost of time, foregoing monetary compensation that could otherwise
be earned by working for a commercial firm or a university.88 however,
these costs can be offset by the pleasure that coders get out of the aesthetics of writing beautiful code,89 ego gratification from peer recognition, or
even tangible benefits such as future or better job prospects, and shares in
open-source based companies.90 The complex interplay of these competing considerations of costs and benefits deserves closer scrutiny and deeper
understanding, especially for the purposes of the analysis that follows in
Part III of this paper.
Broadly, the motivation to involve in an open source project can be either
intrinsic, such as the joy arising from partaking in the intellectual challenges
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of code-writing, or extrinsic, such as better jobs and career advancement.91
Intrinsic motivation can again be separated into two components, subject to
the obvious disclaimer that these components are not mutually exclusive and
can inhere alongside each other in the same individual. For that matter, even
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations can act in tandem to motivate a coder.
These dual components of intrinsic motivation are enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation, and obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation.92 To
understand intrinsic motivation of the first kind, appreciation of the aesthetics of code-writing is essential. In this regard, parallels can be seen between
descriptions of FoSS development that emphasize its spontaneous, unorganized or even chaotic qualities, and traditions in art criticism that praise the
spontaneity of the creation.93 By participating in the FoSS development process, coders place their work up for criticism by an audience of peers spread
all across the world, in much the same way as artists expose the output of
their creative endeavor.94 While users are ultimately concerned only about
the functionality of code, programmers have a notion of its beauty. Much as
an artist extracts form from objects of experience and imposes that on canvas, the programmer imposes the form of an abstract algorithm in, and on, a
particular programming language.95 Similarly, the literary character of code
introduces the possibility of a neat and clean style of writing it, thus adding
a new layer or dimension of beauty. Unsurprisingly, the work of a veteran
would be distinguishable from that of a novice.96 Apart from the aesthetic
quality of the output, the creative “flow” in the process of writing code
and the inner joy in accomplishing a task involving intellectual challenge
contribute to enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation.97 obligation/community-based intrinsic motivation is not different from the shared norms and
values that form the foundation of the free/open source movement,98 which
have already been discussed in sub-part B above.
The most obvious extrinsic motivation is closely tied with the technical
merits of the open source model, which have achieved high levels of public
awareness in the past decade. Along with this success has come significant
corporate presence and participation in this model, and the earmarking,
by technology bellwethers, of specific portions in their budget for open
91
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source contribution.99 The reasons for enhanced corporate presence include
improvement of employee skills through peer-driven training; possibility
of utilizing some of the tools used for developing the open source code to
address in-house technical concerns; gathering “competitive intelligence”
about a competing open source project; gaining superior knowledge and
understanding of the code as part of a business model that provides goods
and services complementary to the open source product; and even better
public relations.100 Because of these reasons, firms that specialize in customized software and software that can be bundled with hardware are more
likely to receive corporate funding than those with a focus on packaged open
source software and support services.101 Again, the flexibility offered by the
open source license to create copyrightable derivative versions and modifications has an impact on funding prospects. Projects operating under BSD
open source licenses are more than twice as likely to receive corporate funding as those operating under the more restrictive GPL or other licenses.102
Apart from firm sponsorship which is a strong extrinsic motivation, coders
also contribute because of delayed benefits such as career advancement and
improvement of programming skills in course of time.103 Another important
signaling incentive is the ego gratification through peer recognition, which is
more likely to materialize in the open source model than in the commercial
software model of development.104
There are studies and theories which attribute greater significance
to extrinsic105 as well as intrinsic106 motivations, and it is difficult, if not
99
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impossible, to conclude on this issue. Most studies rely on surveys conducted
among developers, and have severe limitations, including the absence of
consciousness of motives, or their deliberate or unintended suppression, on
the part of developers.107 A recent study, keeping these limitations in mind,
attempts to study developer motivations by analyzing the actual contributions of developer groups rather than their stated intent.108 The central finding of this study is that developers stand enticed by notable project features
such as the openness of the license, project size, and corporate sponsorship. This is consistent with economic theory that suggests higher long-term
incentives under conditions of greater visibility of performance to the relevant audience, higher impact of individual effort on the final outcome, and
grander information about one’s talents that the performance is structured
to give out.109 empirical patterns from this study also reveal a greater role for
intrinsic factors and reputational factors, and lesser role for other extrinsic
factors such as the expectation of reciprocal contributions from users, in
motivating contribution from volunteers.110 The only reasonable position to
take, based on these studies and theories, is that the motivations for coders
are as varied and diverse111 as it was for a Richard Stallman, on the one
hand, and a Linus Torvalds, on the other,112 to come together to develop
GNU/Linux. At the same time, open source projects have to carefully balance intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, particularly when there is corporate
involvement. Corporate sponsors may naturally expect, and assert, more
influence and say in the development process, and this in turn can give rise
to an apprehension of control, especially in the minds of peripheral developers. This is a recipe for disaster, as it can lead to splintering of the developer
community and the “out-group” developers switching their attention to projects that are perceived as more meritocratic and less susceptible to monetary
influences.113 Peripheral developers have key roles to play both in product
107
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109
110
111
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diffusion through awareness, and enhancement of product quality mainly in
the mature stages of code development.114 It would be unwise to jeopardize
this contribution by sending out the visual of a monolithic corporate presence,115 by swamping the field with too many extrinsic incentives that end up
“crowding-out” initially dominant intrinsic motivations,116 or by festering
coordination failures that studies have shown to exist between corporate
and voluntary developers.117

III. THE FOSS MODEL – A COMMONS SANS

THE

TRAGEDY?

A. The Tragedy of the Commons
The aim in Part I was to provide a landscape of the FoSS model(s), and
some of the structural and philosophical reasons for their viable and stable
growth. The sharing of source code, all important in most FoSS licenses,
has certainly given coders a common pool of creative ideas and expression
from which they stand to benefit. It is tempting therefore to visualize FoSS
as a “commons”118 – a virtual community of like-minded individuals who
band together to create and share common public goods deemed important
to the community.119 In the specific context of FoSS, they are highly skilled
individuals who have remarkable technical ability, are often young, keen to
impress with their problem-solving approach, drawing directly on notions of
meritocracy, and generally, believers in the project of science and rationality.120 But apart from this, their division across the lines of “free” vs. “open
source” models is not split into binary but set along a continuum of beliefs
including one of absolute indifference to the differing ideologies.121
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The extension of this imagination of a “commons” is a world of “commons-based” peer production that relies on human cooperation rather than
candies or the cane to replenish the commons.122 In an approach that seriously
questions the “rational-actor” model, FoSS is used as an example of selfless
cooperation even where there are strong commercial benefits to acting in a
self-interested direction. In other words, coders are contributing time and
effort for free because it enhances their sense of identity and community and
because the activity itself is fun. And even more surprisingly, they continue
to voluntarily contribute despite other contributors getting paid, without
feeling crowded-out.123 The policy prescriptions that follow from this belief
in human capacity and motivation for selfless action (or at least action less
guided by extrinsic than by intrinsic factors) – well exemplified by the FoSS
success story – varies according to the nature and strength of such belief,
and the conditions under which the believers consider this “unusual” human
behaviour to take wings. Thus, they cover the entire gamut ranging from
using licenses as a tool to influence a recursive public to continue doing the
“right” thing,124 reducing copyright term for software to a five year period
that is renewable by another five years, with mandatory access to the source
code once the term expires,125 granting tax benefits to donors of intellectual
property who add to the creative commons,126 ensuring that both technological protection measures and private contracting do not exceed the reach of
copyright law itself,127 permitting reproduction for noncommercial purposes
and recasting copyright as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation,128
suitably redesigning laws to reflect the shift from a pure incentive-based
approach to one guided equally by intrinsic motivations,129 and at the very
least, refraining from policy measures such as expansionism of intellectual
property rights, which foreclose the possibility of a commons built on intrinsic motivation.130
But it is precisely when scouting sound policy prescriptions that we are
also compelled to look to the tragedy of the commons as a cautionary tale.
The case for such a tragedy was convincingly put forth for the first time
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in 1968,131 in an article dealing with population explosion whose zone of
intellectual influence has expanded well beyond this seemingly narrow, yet
important, concern. The imagery used was a pasture open to all, which for
years did not face excessive utilization because the herdsmen and cattle reliant on it never went above the carrying capacity of the land due to high mortality rates. At a certain point in time, population stabilizes. Now, those free
to exploit the pasture numerically exceed its carrying capacity, giving rise
to the tragedy. every herdsman, being a rational actor, looks to expand his
herd because the benefits of such expansion are individualized but the costs
are collectively borne by all herdsmen who use the pasture. In the absence of
any restrictions that place the cost of using the pasture at the doorstep of the
herdsman who expands his herd, all of them hurtle to ruin.132 This scenario,
where use of the pasture is rivalrous in the sense of one man’s exploitation exhausting another’s capacity to put the same resource to use, has been
sought to be distinguished from the world of intangible property where use
of ideas is non-rivalrous because the originator of the idea is still free to use
it along with every other person who receives the idea.133 however, in the
intangible property space, overuse is not the tragedy we worry about. The
concern is with a different kind of collective action problem: the problem of
incentives to create the resource in the first place.134 Without an ability to
exclude others from using products of the intellect, the creator of the idea
would be unable to charge for the creation. To avoid this problem of inadequate incentives to create, the law steps in and creates a limited monopoly
called an intellectual property right.135

B. Open Source and the Imaginary Tragedy?
To counter this, the open source model is used as a beacon of innovation
in the absence of monopoly incentives. The argument goes that there are
diverse rewards, broadly fitting within three categories, namely, monetary,
intrinsic hedonic, and social-psychological, that motivate people to act in a
certain way.136 The open source model specifically teaches us that under certain conditions, the intrinsic hedonic and socio-psychological motivations
make up for the absence of monopoly incentives to still result in individual
action that positively enhances these set of motivations over action that is
131
132
133
134
135
136

Garrett hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244 (1968).
Id.
Lawrence Lessig, supra note 86, at 22.
James Boyle, supra note 130, at 41-42.
Id. at 42.
yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Or, Linux And The Nature Of The Firm, 112 yale L.J.
369, 426-27 (2002).

[2016] FRee AND oPeN SoURCe SoFTWARe AND The TWIN TRAGeDIeS

195

simply monetarily incentivized.137 The sustaining conditions are as important as the concept of peer-production. The modularity of the project, being
its ability to be split up into independent modules that can separately be pursued by interested participants, is important to tap into non-monetary incentives. Similarly, the higher the granularity of the project in question, being
its ability to be split into smaller sizes, the more likely people are to involve
themselves in working on those independent modules.138 Independent of
the minimum granularity of a project, heterogeneity in the size of the modules may add to its efficiency by allowing contributors with diverse levels of
motivation to collaborate by contributing modules of different sizes, whose
production therefore requires different levels of motivation.139 But it is the
final set of conditions, relating to the integration of contributions by people
scattered all over, where the commons tragedy comes up as a real threat to
the continuance of the project.
Before addressing the nuances of peer-based production that averts this
possible tragedy at the integration stage, it is important to understand the
sense in which “commons” is used because it is indeed a distinct one from
the pasture visualized by hardin.140 hardin’s pasture is an unregulated one,
with untrammeled rights of grazing to every herdsman and his herd. The
information commons imagined by proponents of the open source model is
more on the lines of a shared resource pool, with norms and attributes of
the sharing community facilitating some kind of collective action.141 These
norms evolve, adapting to changes in technology and communities.142 In this
framework, the exclusionary right in respect of property only provides one
side of the story, because access, contribution, extraction, removal, management/participation and alienation are all equally important metrics in gauging the value stakeholders derive from the digital knowledge commons.143 In
other words, hardin’s pasture involved a binary between exclusion and use,
while the digital commons introduces the important variable of effective
governance mechanisms, including social norms and customs, to regulate
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use and contribution.144 This distinction has been extended to argue that
even private property regimes and private corporations, rightly understood,
are only a “managed commons”, and that a movement toward private property is a movement from a ‘commons’ in a physical resource to a ‘commons’
in the social structure of individualized resource management.145
Using this framework of a shared resource pool, the open source model
is put forth as a success story in integrating the contributions of those who
form a part of the “commons”. This success is largely due to the internet,
which makes it fairly easy to permit contributions from a large pool of contributors. Apart from increasing the number of eyeballs, this also leads to
reducing the effects of free riding because the absolute number of contributors responding to some mix of motivations remains sufficiently large.146
There is simultaneous acknowledgement though of factors that could upset
this delicate balance and cause higher defections, leading to ruin of the
peer-production model. Unilateral appropriation, either through commercialization of the common efforts of all for private benefit or even by superimposition of individual values over that of the community, can dangerously
cause a wedge in the community.147 Mechanisms such as the GPL are tailored precisely to address this concern.148

C. Curbing Flights of Fancy – A Realistic Assessment of
Open Source
Taking a sharing regime as the starting point, some discourse has emerged
which critically, and to my mind rightly, examines the illusion of the “commons”.149 The reasoning goes that the success of any sharing regime would
ultimately hinge on informal reciprocity norms that sustain contribution
over withdrawal despite the absence of legal norms. Therefore, rationally,
the cooperation gamble can only be viable when the innovators are repeat
players with sufficiently low discount rate, and a reputation-based enforcement technology exists that sufficiently rewards compliance with, and
penalizes violations of, the governing reciprocity norms.150 however, for
144

145

146
147
148
149
150

yochai Benkler, supra note 136, at 437; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 742-44
(1986).
Carol Rose, supra note 144, at 746-47; Charlotte hess & elinor ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts,
And Facilities: Information As A Common-Pool Resource, 66-SPG Law & Contemp.
Probs. 111, 123 (2003).
yochai Benkler, supra note 136, at 438.
Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 441.
Jonathan M. Barnett, The Illusion of the Commons, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1751 (2010).
Id. at 1764-65, 1769.

[2016] FRee AND oPeN SoURCe SoFTWARe AND The TWIN TRAGeDIeS

197

the cooperation to be a lasting and stable proposition, rather than merely a
viable one, the following features become important: (i) a small group size of
participants, (ii) low capital investment, (iii) low economic value to the innovative output, and (iv) roughly equivalent innovative endowments, i.e. the
capacities and talents of innovators.151 of these, the low capital investment
required to write code is perhaps more important than the others factors,
when applying this framework to the open source model. This factor clearly
places the open source model on a footing separate from industries such
as pharma or telecommunications where the capital investment is higher.
There is some evidence that suggests failure of the open source paradigm in
the biotech industry to incentivize innovation, which is consistent with this
thesis.152 It is also a significant factor to the relative stability of the FoSS
model that contribution to the open source pool is by coders who are of relatively equivalent talents and capacities. There is also some empirical basis
to the claim that smaller, close-knit projects have been more successful than
the ones that claim to tap from the global pool of coders.153 In any event, as
seen in Part I above, there is significant attempt at cohesion of coder groups
through dissemination of core values.
But the more fundamental criticism of claims regarding the avoidance of
a tragic commons can be made simply by revisiting the evolution of FoSS,
discussed in Part I, sub-part A. This requires us to explore hardin’s commons a little more deeply. hardin does not start off with a tragic commons.
The pasture is initially one that can accommodate competing uses. It is at
a certain point, when the factors leading to population decline are brought
within control, that the pasture feels the pressure of overuse and ultimately
comes to ruin. In every system, even the most well designed one, there could
be a certain element of free riding. This metamorphoses into a tragedy
when the burden of that free riding cannot be borne by the resource any
more. Viewed this way, the nascent world of software programmers could
be equated with hardin’s pasture in its early years. The limited commercial significance of software and the spirit of scientific enquiry that guided
research in this field prior to the ‘80s could accommodate a system of open
and unfettered appropriation of the source code. By the early ‘80s, software
was becoming increasingly popular as the technology of the future. The
possibility of using software to power machines for personal use and to
solve diverse problems confronting several unconnected industries started
151
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lending it huge commercial significance. This could well have been the trigger point when free riding on the code written by others could potentially
set in motion the chain of events leading to ultimate ruin for all. It is difficult, however, to conclusively establish this because unlike hardin’s pasture,
intellectual property rights for software protection already existed though
by an extension of “literary works” protection in copyright law. Proprietary
software could well have averted the tragedy of the commons in two significant ways: one, by denying free riders the ease of copying that they enjoyed
earlier and thus incentivizing programmers who took software out of the
confines of academic research labs and scaled it up to business models of
the future, and two, equally important here, providing a host of intrinsic
motivations to early day free software coders to develop an alternate model.
The second point can be established by resort to a simple thought experiment. Let us imagine that software protection was equivalent to hardin’s
pasture, and that ideas were unprotected. even if source code were to be
kept confidential, free riders could easily replicate the end product, i.e. the
machine code, and thus hurtle everyone into eventual ruin. There would be
nothing unique about Stallman’s clarion call to fellow coders to write free
software in this already free world. What made Stallman’s call special to
those who contributed is the possibility of creating an alternate world, one
where software was free to be redistributed, adapted, modified and selftaught. A “user community” of project participants in a non-institutional
setting, a phenomenon uncommon in other areas such as biotechnology or
the automobile industry,154 was formed as a response mechanism to a private
property norm. The existing private property regime did something more as
well. It presented Stallman and FSF with a neat mechanism called GPL to
propagate their core beliefs and create a community by inversing the exclusionary right. If not for private property in software, Stallman would have
been unable to do so, and the private appropriation of his code by free riders
would have destroyed the free software community.
The above analysis was only to serve the limited purpose of showing how
the FoSS movement, far from being a notable exception to the tragedy of the
commons, is the product of a system of private property that possibly saved
the day for innovation in software. This does not in any manner preclude
the possibility of using open source models of innovation in appropriate
ventures, under appropriate business conditions.155 That is a separate debate,
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not within the scope of this paper. It is wrong, however, to assert that the
open source model reveals why the tragedy of the commons is not a real
threat. In fact, if there is one thing we can take away from the evolution of
this model, it is the important role played by private property in the creation
of this model in the different ways shown above.

IV. AVERTING A NTICOMMONS: A N I NVALUABLE
CONTRIBUTION OF THE FOSS MODEL
A. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
The inability of the open source model to give much policy insight into
avoiding a tragedy of the commons type situation does not take away its relevance to policy making in a different context and to avoid a different kind
of problem. This problem – termed the “tragedy of the anticommons” due
to the inverse character of its formulation in relation to the “tragedy of the
commons” – was conceptualized by Michael heller pursuant to his study of
property underuse in post-Soviet era Russia.156 observing the empty Moscow
storefronts and the bustling street kiosks, heller theorized that the problem
was with multiple ownership or exclusionary rights in respect of the same
scarce resource, resulting in lack of consensus on optimal use of the resource
and a consequential blocking of use by any of the “owners.”157 Thus, while
the commons tragedy resulted in overuse, the anticommons tragedy led to
underuse. As a policy prescription to avoid this phenomenon, heller proposed that it was not sufficient to create private property rights but also
important to focus on placing the entire bundle of rights in one owner.158 If
necessary, governments ought to redefine and reallocate property rights to
meet this end, including by way of abolishing or expropriating previously
granted rights.159 This is because once an anticommons is formed, institutions and interests coalesce around them, giving rise to deviant strategic
behavior by these beneficiaries to retain the status quo.160 The transaction
costs for freeing up vexatious anticommons could in fact be much higher
than those incurred to resolve a commons tragedy.161
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Subsequently, heller has applied this notion of anticommons to the study
of inefficient underuse of intellectual property rights.162 he has also recast
the anticommons tragedy on a larger canvas, using it to elucidate the problem of gridlock in free markets.163 A major conceptual critique, perhaps due
to heller’s fuzzy articulation of the anticommons in an intangible property space, has been that every piece of intellectual property is a different
resource.164 Therefore, the problem is not one of underuse of any particular resource but a general problem with effective property governance of
different resources. The conceptual solution to this problem may well lie
in larger collective action rather than effective bundling, and anticommons
may, to this extent, obscure the real problem.165 A large part of this critique stems from failure on heller’s part to accurately rearticulate the anticommons problem, at a conceptual level, in the intangible property space.
Revisiting the commons tragedy in the intangible space would be helpful to
resolve this conundrum. As we already saw, the commons tragedy in this
space pertained to the specific problem of under-innovation to create future
intellectual commodities. If we inverse this, the anticommons problem in
the intangible property space would be all about over-incentivisation due to
exclusionary rights over certain types of incremental and basic innovations.
This would finally lead to a gridlock situation where the room for future
innovation is severely curtailed by exclusionary rights that cover important
building blocks for further research and growth. As a necessary corollary,
success in overcoming the tragedy lies not in bundling these rights over
incremental innovations but refusing to grant such wide-ranging exclusionary right incentives in the first place.
Some of the instances from intellectual property rights, which heller uses
to demonstrate the unhappy gridlock effect, make sense once we rearticulate the problem in this conceptual direction of over-incentivisation and
blocking of optimal property use. For instance, the opening up of upstream
biomedical research to excessive or uncoordinated creation of private property results in over-incentivisation,166 and inability to conduct downstream
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medical innovation after a certain point in time.167 This point specifically
occurs when the transaction costs become high enough to dissuade future
researchers from licensing with the multiple patent owners who have already
occupied the field, or the patent applicants whose patents are pending.168
There is no inevitable underuse of any particular patent in this situation but
there is still a strong possibility that the existing patents block each other
out,169 apart from certainly hampering future innovation. Apart from lending conceptual strength to the clearly unfair instances of gridlock pointed
out by heller, rearticulating the anticommons problem also compels us to
acknowledge that not every such instance is truly within the conceptual contours of this problem. For instance, the licensing problem that Google Book
Search has run into is not a “gridlock” because of the blocking effect of
anticommons. It is simply a gridlock caused by the overarching reach of
this project across a wide range of copyrighted material.170 Solutions such as
collective licensing for radio stations do not again resolve an anticommons
problem,171 because no one songwriter is anyways blocking another from
licensing out to a radio station, and no radio station is looking to create a
new song. This can be contrasted with the truly anticommons gridlock faced
by the documentary on Martin Luther King, Jr., where existing copyrighted
works on the same subject effectively blocked the dissemination of a new
one.172
Regardless, heller’s identification of causative factors leading to an anticommons tragedy in the intellectual property space is accurate. he identifies two of them: i) the creation of concurrent fragments of property rights
over connected innovations in the same field of scientific research, and ii)
reach-through license agreements that vest rights in the owner of a patented
invention used in upstream stages of research, over subsequent downstream
discoveries that rely upon such invention.173 The second factor flows from
the first in most cases because had the concurrent fragments not been created in the first place, the subsequent researcher would not have had to submit himself to a reach-through license in order to use the fragment as part
of his research. Both these factors combine to create multiple interests over
167
168
169

170
171
172
173

Id. at 699.
Michael heller, supra note 163, at 50-54.
The airplane manufacturing gridlock, where different patent holders threatened to sue
each other for working their individual patents and thus blocked the manufacture of
warplanes, is a case in point. eventually, the U.S. Government had to intervene through
legislation, create a ‘compulsory patent pool’, and free manufacturers from the threat of
crippling patent litigation. See Id., at 30-31.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 72, 196.
Id. at 9-11.
Michael A. heller & Rebecca S. eisenberg, supra note 162, at 699.

202

The INDIAN JoURNAL oF LAW AND TeChNoLoGy

Vol. 12

connected ideas that can motivate further research and innovation, thereby
hiking up transaction costs for those who need to make use of all these ideas
as part of their research and causing potential holdout problems.174

B. The FOSS Model and the Anticommons Story
A possible solution to an anticommons gridlock, emerging from the above
identification of causative factors, is private action.175 Idealistic as this may
sound at first glance, such action has been forthcoming in certain situations from actors responding to this problem purely out of rational self-interest. Property-preempting investments (PPIs), where private firms spend
significant sums of money to create assets that preempt intellectual property
rights for strategic reasons, are gaining in popularity in industries such as
biotechnology and software.176 PPIs work on the premise that once information enters the public domain, it cannot be privatized.177 Biotechnology and
software are two areas where PPIs have been deployed with fair degree of
success in turning property over to the public domain. In particular, efforts
such as the Merck Gene Index, a public database of gene sequences corresponding to expressed human genes, created with the contribution of several
million dollars from Merck, and the Single Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP)
consortium to place SNPs, valuable as ‘disease markers’, in public domain
through the conjoint efforts of private firms and nonprofit research organizations, have thwarted potential anticommons effect in the biotech field.178
The involvement of private firms, including IBM, in FoSS development, has
also been explained as an attempt to preclude property rights entanglements
on a key “input”. Because Linux comes without the threat of leverage and
dominance that are always present with a proprietary operating system,
both IBM and its customers can control their own fate and rely on the GPL
to commit to future or customized versions of Linux without the looming
threat of high transaction costs.179
This is definitely a significant impact of the FoSS model in facilitating
a private solution to the anticommons problem. But an even larger contribution of this model in this direction has gone unrecognized. The model
itself, and not just private investments in the model, has been instrumental
in averting anticommons tragedy. In Part II, while teasing out the distinction
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between hardin’s pasture and the FoSS world, an important distinguishing
factor was seen to be the origins of FoSS in a world of proprietary software.
In other words, the prior existence of legal protection over this “field” made
it different in its content and character from hardin’s pasture. however,
there is a conceptual prism using which such “commons”, carved out from
a larger proprietary field, can be better understood. This is the notion of a
“constructed commons” that can be used to solve innovation problems.180 In
this regard, eight clusters have been identified to investigate any particular
constructed cultural commons, with the eventual goal of relating particular
characteristics to the results produced by certain types of sharing arrangements.181 These are: i) the relevant history and narrative of the commons;182 ii)
the entitlement structures and resource provisions that define its contents;183
iii) the institutional setting and the social practices, disciplines and norms
that the commons inhabits;184 iv) the formal legal structures put in place to
facilitate collective action via the commons;185 v) governance mechanisms
such as membership criteria, resource contribution and appropriation standards, decision-making rules, provisions for resolving conflicts over membership and resources, and sanctions for violations, that guide the operation of
the commons;186 vi) the interface between internal governance mechanisms
(cluster no. v) on the one hand and external mechanisms (cluster nos. ii, iii
and iv) on the other;187 vii) specific solutions to innovation problems that the
commons can be associated with;188 and viii) the costs and risks associated
with the commons.189 The relevance of these clusters is not confined to delineating the contours of any “constructed commons”. It extends to helping
us distinguish between a “constructed commons” in the true sense of that
expression, and other PPIs including “defensive publications” that render a
patent application “anticipated” or at least “obvious”, and thus disentitled
to patent protection.190
heller recognizes the role of such voluntary arrangements in overcoming
gridlock, and even mentions open source as one such mechanism along with
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his more explored one of patent pools.191 To truly appreciate the contribution of FoSS in this direction though, a simple thought experiment, similar
to the one carried on in Part II while demonstrating proprietary software’s
contribution in averting a commons tragedy, would suffice. As seen from
the evolution and practice of programming, most code writing builds on
existing code and is in that sense, derivative. Now imagine a world where
Stallman had chosen not to exercise his “good conscience”, not to write his
legendary forum posting on 27th September, 1988 appealing to the community of coders,192 and instead, signed the non-disclosure and software
license agreements that were gradually taking over as the industry norm.
Apart from its direct practical consequences such as a paid-for Android or
more expensive server software, this world would have led to a race to create
multiple proprietary versions of code, each of which could potentially block
the other out over time. The rationale for this effect can be traced to the
peculiar character of copyright protection, where the maker of the original
also enjoys monopoly in respect of derivative works that adapt or modify the
original. Therefore, those who create the derivative of an already licensed
derivative work have to go back and take licenses from both the original
coder and the owner of the first derivative work. Indeed, this would not
have immediately become a concern because initial developers of derivative
code could well take licenses from the original coder. Problems in licensing,
including hike in transaction costs and deleterious blocking effects, would
surface only once a certain threshold was crossed. This threshold would
depend on the number of derivative versions in the field and the splintering
of rights in such versions in the hands of different actors. Soon, the frenzied
innovation activity in the evolutionary days of software would have dried up
or become prohibitively expensive. It would not be a stretch of imagination
to contend that Stallman’s decision to keep the source code open, and more
important for the purposes of the anticommons tragedy, to nullify private
property in derivative versions of his code using the GPL mechanism, came
in at exactly this juncture.
Unfortunately, while conceptualizing “open source”, it has been categorized as a “constructed cultural commons”, which arose as a solution to
collective action, coordination, or transactions cost problems that existed
apart from intellectual property rights.193 This is in contrast to other pooling
arrangements such as the SNP consortium, discussed above, and the publicly available databases of genomic sequences that are part of the human
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Genome Project. These have been categorized as “constructed cultural commons”, which arose as a solution to collective action, coordination, or transactions cost problems that existed because of intellectual property rights.194
The above bracketing of “open source” within the former category is incorrect, and it fits as much into the second category as patent pools. Analysis
of the FoSS model using the eight clusters for investigating a “constructed
commons”, mentioned above, makes this amply clear. To do so, let us revisit
Part I of this paper.
First, as shown in sub-part A of Part I, the evolution of FoSS (cluster no.
i) was a response to the proprietary norms in intellectual property law generally, and copyright law and trade secrecy protection in particular (cluster
no. vii). The major resource for this “constructed commons” (cluster no.
ii) was the “source code” that would otherwise be kept secret, or rendered
unusable, because of trade secret and copyright protection respectively. The
core values of the FoSS movement, discussed in sub-part B of Part II, were
built around a strong anti-intellectual property rights discourse, and the
institutional setting of this community (cluster no. iii) can be contrasted
with that of the proprietary software industry. The GPL licensing mechanism, discussed in the same sub-part, was craftily designed to propagate a
commons of “free software” that would otherwise be monopolized by resort
to copyright law and trade secret protection. This also explains the choice
of copyleft (cluster no. iv) over mere dedication to the public domain. Unlike
patent law, where such dedication could have preempted the patentability
and monopolization of an incremental idea by a subsequent innovator, the
low threshold of ‘originality’ required for copyright protection of derivative
works in copyright law would have possibly resulted in monopolization of
incremental derivative works built on works already in the public domain.195
Apart from this, the institutional structures for internal governance (cluster
no. v), discussed in sub-part C of Part I, show how different open source
projects have encouraged decentralized innovation while at the same time,
brought in mechanisms to control “forking” and uncoordinated innovation
(cluster no. vi). When viewed in tandem with the different extrinsic and
intrinsic motivations for participation in open source projects, it is clear that
the focus has always been on creating an innovation model that serves as an
alternate paradigm to the “incentive structures” of closed models of innovation built on intellectual property rights (again, cluster no. vii). A major risk
194
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associated with the commons (cluster no. viii) is also caused by intellectual
property rights: the possibility of a private appropriation, rendered stronger
in the case of more flexible licenses such as Apache and BSD, as shown in
sub-part B of Part I. For all the above reasons, the FoSS model is indeed a
“constructed commons” created in response to problems caused by intellectual property rights. And it is one that has, with fair bit of success, averted
an anticommons problem in the intellectual property space.

V. CONCLUDING R EMARKS A ND LESSONS
P ROPERTY POLICY

FOR

I NTELLECTUAL

The two substantive arguments made in this paper can be summarized as
follows: (1) the FoSS model cannot be used to convincingly put forth a case
against the occurrence of a tragic commons in a world without private property; and (2) the FoSS model can, however, be considered a successfully
constructed cultural commons that has gone a long way toward preventing
an anticommons problem in the software industry. The policy measures suggested below are suitably tailored to fit within what would naturally follow
from these arguments. These measures are only guidelines for the direction
that statutory reform may take, and not an exact articulation of the proposed reform.
The FoSS model shows that the time is ripe for the United States to
expand its system of moral rights protection beyond visual artistry to
other fields of creativity and innovation, such that creators are incentivized
through attribution. Reputational benefit has been a strong motivation for
coders to participate in FoSS development. Most FoSS licenses guarantee,
through effective notice mechanism, the dissemination of author information. even otherwise, the CVS mechanism and other technical infrastructure
facilitating FoSS collaboration ensure that the coders who offer programming solutions to complex problems are duly credited for their contribution.
This is not quite the case with proprietary software. By legislating for a
strong moral rights protection akin to what exists in europe or even India,
the United States would be formally recognizing an intrinsic motivation
that can go a long way in attracting creative contribution to collaborative
efforts in various fields of innovation. This would also act as an appropriate
trade-off in settings that involve incremental innovation, as compared with
the alternate option of incentives through property rules.196 The latter kind
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of incentives can result in economic inefficiency,197 as well as difficulties in
redistribution of entitlements198 at a certain point when problems, such as
the anticommons problem for instance, freeze up innovation and necessitate
such redistribution.
This takes us directly to the issue of property incentives for derivative
works in copyright law and incremental innovations in patent law. Models
such as FoSS and patent pools teach us the perils extant in property rules
that protect incremental innovations. Therefore, a suitable combination of
liability rules or effective compulsory licensing mechanisms, along with
the tightening of standards to attract property protection for incremental
innovations, is essential to avoid a gridlock. First, copyright law must be
changed to reflect the position that derivative works are entitled to copyright
protection only if they meet a heightened standard of originality. Similarly,
patent protection should be denied to new forms of known substances or
inventions unless they meet certain well-defined and enhanced levels of efficacy. Second, even in such cases, copyright law must necessarily make a
distinction between pure works of art and fiction, and academic works or
computer software that are useful for purposes of further modification. In
the case of the latter, there is a compelling State interest in avoiding a gridlock, and the only way in which this interest can be promoted is by either
replacing property protection against derivative works with liability rules
against misappropriation, or by retaining property protection but putting in
place effective mechanisms for compulsory licensing of the works. Similarly,
patent protection for general purpose technologies199 and upstream research
tools that can be used to create further products downstream should be
coupled with an effective compulsory licensing mechanism for such inventions so that a gridlock in future innovation is avoided. Finally, trade secret
protection must be denied in any situation where the innovator asserts copyright protection in respect of academic works or computer software. The
innovator must thus be forced to make the trade-off between the benefits of
non-disclosure and disclosure, in a manner akin to patent protection. only
this can ensure the avoidance of a gridlock that can otherwise be caused by
resorting to trade secrecy and non-disclosure agreements.
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